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Abstract. In this article, we focus on the question of target management resistance and the incidence of subse
quent bids. A Poisson count data model is used where the dependent variable represents the number of bids (count)
received and the independent variables comprise target management actions and firm specific characteristics.
Of the target management actions considered, legal defense and the entry of a white knight are associated with
additional bids. With respect to firm specific characteristics, we find that a high initial bid premium deters subse
quent bids. Firm size is also significant and has an interesting relationship with the number of bids received.
Larger target firms tend to receive more bids; however, the number of bids tails off for firms with assets exceedng
$12 billion.
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1. Introduction
Target managements facing hostile tender offers often resist the takeover attempt by way
of litigation and a whole range of anti-takeover measures. This defensive activity has led
to some controversy and the formulation of two competing hypotheses.1 The managerial
entrenchment hypothesis essentially holds that in undertaking defensive actions, incumbent
managers act in self-interest (to hold on to their jobs/perquisites) and against the interests
of stockholders. The stockholder interest hypothesis contends that a diverse body of stock
holders are at a competitive disadvantage when confronted with a hostile tender offer. They
empower incumbent management to take actions necessary to elicit a fair bid price. It has
been shown that when the tender offer fails, the stock price reverts to the pre-contest level
(see Bradley et al. (1983)). In such cases, since target stockholders lose their premium,
it could be argued ex post that target management was driven by entrenchment motives.
From the stockholders' perspective, target management resistance ought to generate an auc
tion that eventually leads to a successful takeover.
In this article, we consider a related but somewhat narrower question. We analyze suc
cessful tender offers which almost by definition are wealth enhancing to investors who hold
stock in the target firm prior to the public announcement of the first bid. Our sample con
sists of target firms where management initially resisted the tender offer but eventually
capitulated either to the original bidder or to some other bidder who may have entered the
bjdding process. From our sample construction, it should be clear that we have consciously

chosen to study those target firms whose managements appear to have been guided by
stockholder interest, at least when viewed ex post. Our intention is not to revisit the man

agement entrenchment versus stockholder interest hypotheses per se. Rather, conditioned
on the premise that target management has acted in stockholder interest, our aim is to
study (a) the nature of target management actions that lead to an auction type process and
(b) whether an auction is spurred or inhibited by finn specific characteristics that are beyond
management's immediate sphere of influence. We b~Jieve that our study contributes to the
literature on the effects of target management resistance and may have implications for cor
porate policy.
We employ count data methodology in which the dependent variable represents the number
of bids after the initial bid (count) received by the target fi.I1ll.2 For parametric estimation,
we assume that our dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution. Furthermore, as esti
mates may be sensitive to the choice of model, it is essential to test the validity of the para
metric assumptions (see MacKinnon (1992)). Accordingly, we implement two tests whose
results support the Poisson specification for our application.
The mean of the Poisson distribution is a function of a set of independent variables, which
comprise both target management actions and firm specific characteristics. Of the target
management actions considered, legal defense and the induction of a white knight into the
contest are significant and appear to generate further bids. As regards firm specific charac
teristics, a high initial bid premium apparently deters third parties from entering the bidding
process, and hence is associated with fewer bids. Firm size is also a significant explanatory
variable with larger firms receiving more bids. However, by including a size-squared variable
we find that beyond a critical point (approximately $12 billion in assets) the number of
bids received by the target firm tends to decline. This fmding is interesting since it suggests
that in the initial stages, size has information value attracting further bids whereas at higher
levels it represents a wealth constraint to bidders.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we outline the data collec
tion procedure and sample characteristics. Section 3 consists of an overview of count data
methodology. Our results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.

2. Data
The sample comprises firms that were targets of tender offers during the period 1978- 1985.
Target firms were identified from the Schedule 140-1 filings which appear in the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) News Digest. A Schedule 140-1 form has to be filed
by the bidder with the SEC prior to the commencement of a tender offer. Subsequently,
the Wall Street Journal lndex (WSJI) was scanned to pick those firms which resisted the
tender offer. In addition, the nature of target management resistance and the outcome of
the tender offer were recorded. Our sample consists of 126 target firms which were taken
over, within an observation period of 52 weeks.
In this study, the dependent variable represents the number of bids (count) after the ini
tial bid received by the target fmn. The following explanatory variables are considered;
see Table 1 for details of sample characteristics.

Table l. Descriptive measures of sample variables.
The sample represents 126 firms that were 1argets of tender
offers during the period 1978-1985. Target firms were identified
from the Schedule 140-1 filings which appear in the Securities

and Exclu:mge Commission News Digest. The iiaU Street Jour
nal index was scanned to pick those firms which resisted the
tender offer and to record the nature of larget management
resistance. Relevant firm specific characteristics were obtained
from various sources.
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

1.738

1.432

0.428
0.182
0.103
0.595
1.346
0.251
1.219
0.269

0.496
0.387
0.305
0.492
0.189
0.185
3.096
0.445

Dependent Variable (count)
Number of subsequent bids

Explanatory Variables
Legal Defense*
Real Restructuring*
Financial Restructuring*
White Knight*
lnltial Bid Premium**
Institutional Holdings(%)
Size***
Regulation*

*These variables are binary taking value 1 when action is
laken; 0 otherwise.
**Represent~ percen1age excess over the stock price 14 days
prior to the public announcement; 1.0 represents base level.
-Represents book value of tolal assets in $ billions.

2.1. Target Management Actions

i. Legal Defense takes value 1 if target management responds with a lawsuit; 0 other
wise. The choice of this variable is due to the Jarrell (1985) study. Jarrell concluded
that target managements appear to take a value maximizing gamble by engaging in
legal defensive activity. If the fLling of a lawsuit, or the threat to do so, creates a delay
in the tender offer process, this may allow other bidders to enter. On the other hand,
if the lawsuit is perceived to be more than a delaying tactic, the original bidder may
decide to withdraw the offer and other potential bidders may be similarly deterred.
However, given the nature of our sample and the results from the Jarrell study, we
expect this variable to have a positive influence on the number of bids received.
ii. Real Restructuring takes value 1 if target management proposes some change in the
asset structure; 0 otherwise.
iii. Financial Restructuring takes value 1 if target mangement proposes some change
in the ownership structure; 0 otherwise.
The two variables cited above were originally characterized by the Dann and
DeAngelo (1988) study. This study strongly indicts target management for entrench
ment behavior. If the Dann and DeAngelo findings carry over to our sample, we may

observe these type of actions dampening the auction process. However, as previously
pointed out, our sample consists of successful tender offers which implies, at least
ex post, that management may have been trying to secure the best deal for stockholders.
Of course, it is always possible that management may have been actually trying to
protect their own interests and gave up the fight on realizing that it was a lost cause.
We are therefore neutral as to the effects of proposed changes in asset/ownership struc
ture on the auction process.
iv. White Knight takes value 1 if target management invites a friendly third party to
enter the bidding; 0 otherwise.3 Our definition of a white knight resembles that followed
by Banerjee and Owers (1992). This type of management action differs substantially
from the type of actions discussed above. By inviting a friendly bidder into the con
test, management is signaling that it is prepared to cede at least some control. The
entry (or potential entry) of at least one additional bidder is expected to stimulate
the auction process.

2.2. Firm Specific Characteristics
v. Initial Bid Premium represents the percentage excess of the first hostile bid price
over the market price of the firm's stock fourteen working days prior to the tender
offer announcement. The idea is to select a time frame that allows for information
leakage prior to the public announcement.4 We expect this variable to exercise a nega
tive influence on additional bids. Our reasoning is that third party bidders are likely
to be deterred by a high initial bid. This could be due either to a perception that the
bidder is overpaying5 or the bid is preemptive in nature, which by definition should
deter subsequent bids.
vi. Institutional Holdings percentage serves as a proxy for stockholder independence.
The percentage of institutional holdings to total outstanding stock was ascertained from
the Standard & Poors' Stockholder Guide. If institutions play a monitoring role, tar
get managements are less likely to engage in overt entrenchment behavior. Also, the
presence of a seemingly uncommitted block of stockholders is clearly a plus from
the perspective of potential bidders.6 Accordingly, we expect this variable to have a
positive influence on the number of bids.
vii. Size represents the total assets of the target firm, in book value terms, in $ (billions).
This information was collected from Compustat/Annual reports. The effect of size
on the auction process is not obvious. If capital rationing is a practical reality, then
size may operate as a wealth constraint to potential bidders. On the other hand, size
may also proxy as an information variable. Tender offers for large firms are likely to
receive more media coverage and thereby attract the attention of opportunistic bidders.
We therefore include a size-squared variable to capture the potential non-monotonic
effect of size on the expected number of bids.
viii. Regulation takes value 1 if either the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Depart
ment intervenes by way of requesting additional information or mounting a court chal
lenge to the tender offer; 0 otherwise. We expect regulatory scrutiny to have a negative
effect on the auction process.

3. Methodology
Information on many economic variables appears in the form of a count denoting the num
ber of times a phenomenon has occurred. Regression models that fail to explicitly take
this characteristic of the dependent variable into account are clearly inefficient. Count data
regression models belong to a class of limited dependent variable models in which the depen
dent variable, Y;, takes on only non-negative integer values. Recently, such models have
been employed in econometric research with such applications as: number of visits to a
doctor (Cameron and Trivedi (1986)), number of patents issued (Hausman et al. (1984)),
number of daily homicides (Grogger (1990)), number of strikes (Cameron and Trivedi
(1990)). In this article, we employ such a model in the context of the number of takeover
bids received by a target frrm after the initial bid.
Poisson regression models have been often used as a benchmark for analyzing count data.
The Poisson probability distribution for Y; is
i

=

1, 2, ... , N,

(3.1)

where Y; = 0, 1, 2, . . . , denotes the realized value of the dependent variable Y;. Further
more, the independent variables Xu U = 1, ... , k) are incorporated by considering a
regression specification of the form
A;

=

(3.2)

exp(X;/3),

where {3 is an unknown vector of k parameters to be estimated. This specification ensures
non-negative predictions given by y = exp(X)J)? The parameter vector~ is estimated by
maximizing the following log-likelihood function derived from (3.1):
N

£

=2: [-exp(X;/3) + Y;(X;/3)

- ln(y;!)].

(3.3)

i=l

The mean of Y;, conditional on X;. is given by E(Y;IX;) = A; = exp(X;/3). Therefore, as
iJE(Y;IX;)IiJXu = {3jE(Y;IX;), the coefficients are interpreted as average proportionate
changes in E(Y;IX;) for a unit change in X;.s
A property of the Poisson regression model is the conditional mean-variance equality
of Y; viz. E(Y;IX;) = Var(Y;/X;) = A;. This equality is often considered restrictive since
real data frequently exhibit overdispersion. As failure of the above restriction can lead to
distorted inferences, specification tests for a Poisson model are based on inspecting the
conditional mean-variance discrepancies in the sample. A test of overdispersion is given by: 9
N

T =

2: [(Y; -

A;) 2

-

Y;]/(2EAr)"\

(3.4)

i=l

where, asymptotically, T has a standard normal distribution un4er the null hypothesis of
no extra variations with A; replaced by its maximum likelihood estimate. The value of this

statistic in our sample is - 1.02, implying no extra Poisson variations. Dean and Lawless
(1989) propose an adjustment which makes the above test perform better in smnJJer samples.
The sample value of this adjusted test statistic is - 0.30, which still supports the Poisson
model.

4. Results
The central question that we seek to address in this study is whether target management
resistance is associated with setting an auction process in motion. As outlined above, we
employ a count data approach to capture the auction element in a takeover contest. A basic
but relevant question is whether target stockholders are in fact better off under an auction
scenario, i.e. , are additional bids necessarily wealth enhancing?
To lay this foundation , we report the results of a standard event study analysis in Table
2. We compute cumulative average abnormal returns (CARS) over three event windows:
(-5, 60), (0, 60) and (+5, 60). This is done for the total sample as well as subsamples
representing firms that received zero, one, two, three or more bids beyond the initial bid.
Table 2. CARS % (Z-5tatistics' in parentheses).

Cumulative average abnormal returns (CARS) 2 over various event windows for the total sample
and various subsamples based on number of additional bids received; day 0 corresponds to
public announcement date of tender offer.
Event Windows

Total Sample
(N = 125)l

Zero Bids Beyond Initial Bids
(N - 9)

(-5, 60)

(0, 60)

(+5, 60)

33.49
(24.40)*

20.59
(15.55)*

8.25
(6.63)*

17.83
(3.53)*

8.76
(2.03)*"'

-3.65
(-0.35)

(N

One Bid Beyond Initial Bid
= 62)

37.50
(17.72)*

22.93
(10.96)*

8.83
(3 .86)"

l'wo Bids Beyond Initial Bid
(N = 31)

24.52
(10.64)*

13.94
(6.29)*

4.25
(2.66)*

Three or More Bids Beyond Initial Bid
(N = 23)

40.92
(13.23)*

27.90
(9.68)*

16.76
(6.24)*

*represents significance at a = 0.01
**represents significance at a = 0.05
I . Z.Statist.ics computed as per standard procedure in the literature. Refer to Dodd and Warner
(1983) for details.
2. CARS estimated based on the standard market model approach. Market model parameters
were estimated from days - 150 through -31 relative to the event date.
3. One firm had to be dropped from the original sample due to insufficient data points in
the estimation period.

Table 3. Poisson model estimation results.
A Poisson count data model is estimated where the dependent variable
represents the number of bids (count) after the initial bid received by
the target firm. The explanatory variables considered are various target
management actions and fum specific cbaracterstics.
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

Target Management Actions
Legal Defense
Real Restructuring
F'lnaocial Restructuring
White Knight

Firm Specific Clu:zracreristics
Initial Bid Premium
Institutional Holdings
Size
Size Squared
Regulation
*representS significance at
**represents significance at

01
01

t.Statistics

0.986

1.846**

0.260
-0.195
0.074
0.481

1.723**
-1.015
0.341
3.030*

- 0.677
- 0.361
0.178
- 0.007
- 0.029

-1.798**
-0.853
2.970*
-2.416*
-0.183

= 0.01
= 0.10

Ttsrs of Poisson SpecificaJion (Mean-ij,riance Equality)
Standard Test Statistic = -1.02 (p = 0.3078)
Dean-Lawless Adjusted Test Statistic = -o.30 (p = 0.7642)

The pattern that emerges confirms the intuition that target stockholders are indeed better
off receiving more rather than fewer bids. The CARS are highest for the "three or more
bids" subsample and lowest for the "zero bids" subsample across all event windows. More
over, the mean CARS for subsamples with higher bids is significantly greater than the mean
CARS for subsamples with lower bids within each event window.10 This is verified by a
series of "differences in means" t-tests at the referee's suggestion.
The estimation results of the Poisson model are presented in Table 3. We find that of
the target management action variables, legal defense and white knight are significant with
positive coefficients (implying more counts) as hypothesized. Legal defense probably works
by inducing delay in the process that allows potential bidders to enter. This result broadly
comports with the Jarrell (1985) study, which was carried out in the more traditional wealth
measurement (excess returns) framework. The white knight variable is strongly significant
(p-value = 0.003) . Clearly the entry of a friendly bidder fucilitates the auction process
and benefits target stockholders. This finding also complements the recent results reported
by Banerjee and Owers (1992), who show that white knight bidders on average experience
negative returns. While a takeover contest is generally not a zero-sum game, we infer that
a white knight strategy by target management is successful in bidding up the offer price.
The financial and real restructuring variables appear to be neutral in terms of their effect
on the number of bids received by target firms.

So far as firm specific characteristics are concerned only the initial bid premium and
size variables are significant. The level of institutional ownership and regulatory interven

tion apparently do not influence the bidding process. The bid premium coefficient is negative,
which implies that a high initial bid premium deters subsequent bids. This result suggests
that there may be value to preemptive bidding.11
An interesting result pertains to the relationship between target firm size and the number
of bids received. We reiterate our reasoning regarding the size variable as follows: ceteris
paribus, an increase in target firm size is associated with fewer bids; the idea being that
potential bidders would bump into a wealth constraint. Alternatively, since media coverage
of the takeover contest is generally proportionate to target firm size, a larger firm may
attract more bids by virtue of being in the public eye. In a sense, subsequent bidders enjoy
an informational free ride. As both these effects may be present, we attempt to capture
the postulated non-monotonic relationship between size and expected bids by including
a size-squared variable along with a size variable.l 2
From Table 3, we find that both the size and size-squared variables are strongly signifi
cant with positive and negative coefficients respectively. This suggests that for smaller firms,
the information effect dominates the wealth constraint effect leading to further bids. However,
size represents a wealth constraint that operates as a deterrent to additional bids for very
large target firms. The information effect for these firms may be muted since they are ex
tensively covered by the financial press even prior to the takeover bid.
We investigate the size effect further by simulating the number of additional bids associated
with different firm sizes holding other regressors constant at their mean values (refer to
Figure 1). We observe that for most firms the information effect appears to be predominant.
It is possible that the size variable captures more than just information release, via media
coverage, about a target firm going into play. For instance, Roll (1988) summarizes the
argument regarding the connection between executive rewards and firm size. The managers
of the bidder firms may have an incentive for growth, including growth by takeover, even
when there is no anticipated gain for their shareholders. This can be an added rationale
for larger target firms attracting more bids.
The wealth constraint effect is significant only for firms with total assets exceeding $12
billion, which represent a small proportion of our sample. At first glance, the finding that
the wealth constraint kicks in at such a high level is surprising. However, it should be noted
that the late seventies and eighties (the period represented by our sample) were characterized
by relatively easy access to debt capital for corporate restructuring activity.

5. Conclusion

In this article we implement a relatively new methodology in the area of corporate finance.
We use a count data model to explain the variations in the numbers of bids received by
firms whose managements resist takeover. We first confirm using a standard event study
approach that there is a positive association between the number of bids received and target
stockholder wealth. We find that of the target management actions considered, legal defensive
activity and the induction of a white knight are significantly associated with additional bids.
Our findings spring from an examination of successful tender offers and may provide policy
directions to future target managements, whose intent is to maximize stockholder interest.
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Figure I. Simulated effect of firm size on mean number of bids.

In a more positive line of inquiry, we also examine various firm specific characteristics
and their effect on the auction process. A high initial bid premium seems to preempt fur
ther bids. Further, firm size has a non-monotonic effect on additional bids. Except for very
large target firms (assets exceeding $12 billion), size is positively associated with addi
tional bids.
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Notes
l. See, for example, DeAngelo and Rice (1983).
2. We confirm using a standard event study approach that additional bids are in fact wealth enhancing to target
stockholders. Details are provided in the results section.
3. The inclusion ofthis variable is due to the referee's suggestion that we consider the influence of friendly bids.
4. The precedent for fourteen days was set in Walkling (1985), who employs a logit model to predict takeover
success.
5. For instance, refer to Varaiya and Ferris (1987) for an analysis of the winner's curse.
6. Refer to Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) on the role of institutional investors in the context of voting on
anti-takeover amendments proposed by management.
7. Note that the standard linear regression models do not guarantee non-negative predictions.
8. Tn linear regression models, the coefficients (3j = iJE(Y;IX;)tax0 simply measure changes in E(lj/X;) for a
unit change in X;.
9. Refer to Cameron and Trivedi (1990) and Dean and Lawless (1989) for details.
10. The one ldnk in the pattern is that the CARS for the "two bid" subsamp!e are lower than those for the "one
bid" subsample. Other than this one irregularity, our results support the association between number of bids
and stockholder wealth maximization.
11 . Refer to Fishman (1988) for a theoretical treatment of preemptive bidding in takeover contests.
12. Even though our specification, (3.2), implies non-linear influences of regressors on expected counts, the
non-monotonic effect ofa given regressor is captured by including its squared value as an additional variable.
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